When we consider the concepts and assumptions of a way of interpreting we are not abstracting ourselves from concrete analytical practice, but are dealing with one dimension of that practice. When a person’s assumptions and concepts change, aspects of his therapeutic work will also change. The philosophical ideal of conceptual clarity means that one strives to be able to recognize how he interprets what is going on—he strives to recognize how he proceeds with the therapeutic process in relation to other (...) options. In that way he has a far better chance of allowing the experience to speak for itself to him, i.e., when he knows something about his own assumptions in relation to a variety of other assumptions, he is able to hear how an occurrence exceeds or differs from his own accustomed ways in which he makes sense of things. (shrink)

Why Fichte? I wondered, when the six-day Fichte Tagung was announced for Zwettl, Austria. Hegel and Kant and Hume had had their festivals. I expected that. But in spite of some party spirit for Fichte there is hardly a competitive passion on the part of Fichte people against Kant and Hegel and Hume people that would prompt a world congress. There is no International Society for the study of Fichte. There is indeed intense interest in his work, witnessed in the (...) new and carefully edited collection of his works, which is still in progress, the numerous, excellent and recently published studies, and the number of excellent Fichte articles appearing in leading journals. There is particular and growing interest in his revisions of his Wissenschaftslehre, in which his notion of intuition develops remarkably. His fully developed position does indeed offer a subtle and profound option to Hegel’s interpretation of consciousness. His influence on nineteenth century figures in literature as well as in philosophy is striking and important. But that has been so for a century and a half, and the same can be said of Schelling’s later work and influence, which is much less studied. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 47, Issue 1, pp 19 - 38 In its engagement with Derrida’s _unheimlich_ responsibility elaborated in _The Beast and the Sovereign_, Volume One, this essay is about death, words, silence, and lives of people and animals. It is also about experiences that to varying degrees bring lives to words and words to lives. Its guiding hypotheses are that death, words, silence, and lives in their _happenings exceed_ the laws that function to identify them and that none of (...) their happenings is sovereign in relation to the others. The essay culminates with Derrida’s engagement with ungrounded time when completion and beginning are simultaneous. That simultaneity constitutes a threshold in which people must respond. For Derrida the threshold is shadowed by his own approaching death. (shrink)